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of-use#LAAABSTRACT Charismatic authority flourishes in places where some social scientists 
evidently do not expect to  find it - in late modernity and in highly complex and 
instrumentally orientated technoscientific organizations. This paper documents and 
interprets participants' testimony about the workings of wartime Los Alamos in 
relation to  the charisma of its Scientific Director, J.  Robert Oppenheimer. We treat 
charisma as  an interactional accomplishment, and examine its r61e in technoscientific 
organizations. Los Alamos was a hybrid place, positioned at the intersection of 
military, industrial and academic forms. Everyday life there was marked by a high 
degree of normative uncertainty. Structures of authority, communication and the 
division of labour were contested and unclear. The interactional constitution of 
Oppenheimer as  charismatic enabled him to articulate, vouch for and, finally, come 
to embody a conception of legitimate organizational order as  collegial, egalitarian 
and communicatively open. We offer concluding speculations about the continuing 
importance of charismatic authority in contemporary technoscientific organizations. 
Just as  normative uncertainty is endemic in late modernity, so too, we argue,  is 
charisma. 
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Charisma and Complex Organization 
Charles Thorpe and Steven Shapin 
A Magic Mountain 
Late in 1942 there began to grow up in the New Mexico high desert a site 
whose like the world had never seen before. It was the size of a small town, 
encompassing many  of  the institutions and mundane relations  of  similar 
small towns, yet its small-town neighbours miles away were not supposed 
to know it even existed.  Officially, at least,  some of  the most illustrious 
people coming to live there  changed their names  and, supposedly,  their 
public identities, upon entry. It was a place of both power and paradox. 
Subject to military security, surrounded by a chain-link fence and a moat 
of secrecy, it was quite unlike the academic world from which many of its 
inhabitants  had  come.  It  was  a  topsy-turvy  world,  a  technoscientific 
carnival, in which hairy-chested generals fought a sometimes losing battle 
for  authority against  pointy-headed  intellectuals.  It was  a cosmopolitan 
community with very special properties. It was made up of young people: 
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the average age  of  its  scientific inhabitants was  in  some calculations  29 
years - in others 24 - and its director was  just  38 when he took up his 
appointment. There were a lot of babies, but there were 'no invalids, no in- 
laws, no unemployed, no idle rich and no poor'.' 
It was  at  once  a workplace  and a place  of  residence. Men used  to 
travelling miles  from home to work  now  walked  yards.  Many  of  those 
who had wives  and children had them on site. Much of  what was  done 
there was in the nature of basic inquiry, but the institutional purpose of the 
place was rigidly defined by an instrumental goal, the making of a techno- 
logical artefact whose broad specifications were laid down in advance of 
most of the inquiries relevant to bringing that artefact into being. 
In realizing that goal, scientists and engineers accustomed to limited 
financial  resources  and limitless time now  quickly got used  to limitless 
resources and extremely limited time. It was arguably the most expensive 
scientific project in the history of the world. Since the work was on a scale 
and of a complexity unknown in the academy and rare in civilian industry, 
organizational patterns appropriate to managing people and problems were 
largely unavailable.  Scale,  complexity  and security argued for the perti- 
nence of  rigid bureaucratic  separations and military hierarchy, while the 
scientific nature of the task impelled  it towards some version of  an open 
community. When, after several years' work, members of that community 
successfully attained their instrumental goal, they had brought into being 
both  a  new  form  of  modern  technoscientific  organization  and  a  new 
precariousness of  global human existence.  Some of  these members were 
horrified by what they had done - 'Now we're all sons of bitches';'  others 
were  deeply  satisfied - 'I feel  great pride in that ac~omplishment';~  still 
others  were  morally  ambivalent  or  just  reckoned  they  had  done their 
duty. 
And when the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos was  wound down, 
many who  then returned  with  relief  to their  normal university  employ- 
ments recalled that they had never had so much fun and that science had 
never been freer. Some called it 'an island in the sky';%till  others had so 
much fun that they regarded the fence around the place not as something 
that kept its inhabitants in, but as keeping others from coming in. The wife 
of a Los Alamos mathematician called it 'a  mountain resort as well as an 
Army camp' -'just like a camp out'.'  A historian who lived at Los Alamos 
as the wife of a metallurgist calls it 'a magic place',  and, indeed, the words 
'magic',  'mystical'  and 'enchanted' appear recurrently in descriptions both 
of  the laboratory  and of  its  natural  en~ironment.~  Having just  finished 
reading Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain  when  Oppenheimer asked 
him to join  the project,  the experimental physicist Robert Wilson found 
himself particularly attuned to the romance of Los Alamos.' At a party one 
evening,  the theoretical physicist Edward U.  Condon - briefly Associate 
Director of  Los Alamos - 'picked  up a copy of The Tempest and sat in a 
corner reading aloud passages appropriate to intellectuals  in exotic isola- 
tion'.'  Edward Teller brought his own piano to Los Alamos and played it 
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'I  don't  think',  said  one  scientist's  spouse,  'I  shall  ever  live  in  a 
community that had  such  deep  roots  of  cooperation  and friendship'.'' 
Teller  giggled,  'Aren't  we  all  a  big  happy  family  here?'."  Unlike  the 
scientific  world  before  or  outside,  here  there was  said  to  be  'no  class 
distinction' between the scientific big shots and the small fry.  l2 The wife of 
a cosmic-ray physicist - herself a 'computer' - wrote that all the scientists 
'seemed  to  be  enjoying  themselves,  as  scientists  always  do when  they 
ponder their problems together'. They worked hard and, as the expression 
is,  they  partied  hard:  '[Tlhe mere thought  of  returning to  a  sane  and 
prosaic civilian life sounded flat and dull. We  were having the time of our 
lives'.13  The English physicist James Tuck said that it was a 'golden time'; 
the experimental physicist Isidor I. Rabi announced that it was 'the most 
significant period in [our] lives'.'"peaking  in 1967 at a memorial service 
for the lab's wartime Director, the theoretical physicist Hans Bethe reck- 
oned that, for all of  its scientific inhabitants,  Los Alamos 'was really the 
great time of  their lives'."  The project that for many years was  thought 
likely to put an end to 'Western  civilization' - and that still might - was 
judged  by  some participants  to have been  a heroic 'culmination'  of  that 
civilization. 'Here at Los Alamos',  one physicist said, 'I found a spirit of 
Athens, of Plato, of an ideal republic'.16 
Normative Uncertainty and a Sense of Place 
It is not just  the historian or the sociologist who has trouble in deciding 
what kind of place this was;  the residents of the Manhattan Project's  Los 
Alamos installation were also confronted - on a day-to-day  basis - with 
consequential practical  decisions  about proper behaviour and legitimate 
social order at the place where  they lived and worked. Was  it a military 
base,  and, if  so, of what kind? Was  it some social form belonging to the 
academy,  and,  if  so,  was  it  to  be  understood  as  a  type  of  disciplinary 
department,  as  an interdisciplinary research  institute,  as  some summer 
workshop,  momentarily  cut  off  from  normal  social  patterns  and work 
rhythms? Was  it  a large-scale engineering project,  such as those familiar 
from contemporary American industry or the Tennessee Valley Authority? 
Was  it home  or work  or holiday,  or some combination  of  these? Many 
understandings were  available to participants  about what kind  of  place, 
and what kind of social situation, Los Alamos was. 
Different institutional  maps  of  Los Alamos  were constantly at  issue 
between different types of participant as, for example, between scientists 
and the military; between different types of scientist, say, between theoret- 
ical physicists and metallurgists;  and between scientists  of  the same sort 
who happened to have different visions of what Los Alamos was and ought 
to be. As they acted on the basis of those maps, and as they interacted with 
those  who  had  different  maps,  so  participants  created,  sustained  and 
changed the social orders of Los Alamos and its various constituent parts. 
If you knew what kind of place Los Alamos was, then you knew how it was 
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you might call them to account. And contests over institutional order and 
legitimacy  often  presented  themselves  as  contested  maps  of  place  and 
situation. As  one participant said, 'Everyone had his own Los Alamos'." 
Participants'  maps  were  not only  different,  they  were  often  set  in 
conflict with each other. The tensions and paradoxes of Los Alamos were 
constitutive of its identity as a place. They were never resolved such that all 
participants came to share a clear systematic understanding of legitimate 
and normal local social order. Normative uncertainty was  just  endemic. 
And,  despite  some  structural-functionalist  idylls,  such  globally  shared 
understandings  and  senses  of  legitimacy  are,  in  all  probability,  never 
attained  in  any  complex  organization  or  chunk  of  society.  But  in  an 
organization such as Los Alamos normative uncertainty, and contests over 
institutional  maps,  took  highly  developed  and consequential  forms: the 
question of what kind of place Los Alamos was became a matter of intense, 
systematic  and  ongoing reflection.  The upshot  of  formal  and informal 
negotiations about its identity ultimately  took the form of  organizational 
charts  and  associated  legal  and  moral  sanctions  on who  could  talk  to 
whom,  when,  where  and  about  what;  about  who  could  give  orders 
to whom; about time-scales; about where different types of people could go 
and what material and human resources they could effectively command. 
Charismatic Authority and Technoscientific Organization 
It is with reference  to the normative uncertainty of Los Alamos that one 
paradox  came  to  have  special  pertinence - that  between  the  complex 
organization required  to  build  the  bomb  and  the  unique  individual  to 
whose  virtues  and  capacities  many  scientific  participants  attributed  so 
much of the project's success. His scientific colleagues and subordinates at 
Los Alamos recurrently attributed the triumph of the Manhattan Project to 
the individual virtues and capacities  of  its  Scientific Director, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer (1904-67).18  Such attributions were, as we  later point out, 
neither  universal  at  Los Alamos  nor uncontested by  other participants. 
They tended  to be  made  by  other  scientists  and,  more  specifically,  by 
physicists.  And,  while  the  scientists'  version  of  what  happened  at  Los 
Alamos, and why it happened, is undoubtedly important, it is not the only 
version, and in other versions Oppenheimer's r6le looms less large. 
The success of  a technoscientific  project  as large and as complex as 
Los Alamos, an enterprise that brought into being new and elaborate forms 
of institutional differentiation and institutional coordination, one that was 
obliged on a day-to-day basis to wrestle with questions about the precise 
relations  between  bodies  of  specialized  expertise,  each  of  which  was 
deemed necessary for the building of the bomb, was widely ascribed to the 
r6le  of  a  unique,  irreplaceable  individual:  a  'born  leader',  a  'natural 
leader'.19 Enrico Fermi told  Emilio  Segre that 'When  anyone  mentions 
laboratory directors, I think of directors and directors and Oppenheimer, 
who is unique'."  Edward Teller -one of the most awkward characters with 
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that 'Oppenheimer was probably the best lab director I have ever seen'.*' 
Bethe ascribed the high morale and efficiency of Los Alamos substantially 
to the personal r61e  of  Oppenheimer: 'He was  a leader'.'"ilson  called 
Oppenheimer 'our  leader in  every respect',  and referred  Oppenheimer's 
ability to solve day-to-day problems of the laboratory 'to his combination 
of  skill,  wisdom,  and  moral  stature'."  ?en,  in  1963,  Oppenheimer 
returned to Los Alamos for the first time since the War, he was introduced 
by the current Director, Norris Bradbury, as 'Mr Los Alamos', adding that 
Oppenheimer had 'built Los Alamos by the sheer force of personality  and 
character'.14 
Moreover,  the language  used  to describe this  unique individual  has 
cultural resonances that pitch it directly against the very idea of complex, 
bureaucratized modern forms of organization and how such organizations 
are often said to work. Rabi wrote that Oppenheimer succeeded Einstein 
'as the great charismatic figure of the scientific world',  linking Oppenhei- 
mer's  charisma to his  'spiritual  q~ality'.~'  Wilson  reported  how  he  was 
'soon  caught  up  by  the  Oppenheimer charisma'  at  Los Alam~s.~~  The 
chemist  Glenn T.  Seaborg  dwelt  on  Oppenheimer's  'magnetic,  really 
electric, personality,  [and] his charismatic pre~ence'.~'  And Teller spoke of 
the 'brilliance, enthusiasm and charisma' with which Oppenheimer led Los 
Alamos."  So participants tell us that if  we  want to understand the social 
and technical order of one of the most important technoscientific  sites of 
modern times, we should get to grips with the r61e  of  embodied personal 
authority in general, and charisma in particular. 
The prompt is unsettling just  because  the notion of 'charisma'  came 
into social scientists'  vocabulary  early in the 20th century to pick  out a 
form  of  authority  that  was  being  lost  from  the  modern 'disenchanted' 
world, and whose loss was attributed to the rise of bureaucratic modes of 
organization. Los Alamos, or, indeed, any modern technoscientific organi- 
zation, might be thought a surprising place to see charismatic authority at 
SO, among many examples, Magali Larson writes that science is 
characterized by 'the supreme objectivity of technique',  and that it is the 
submergence  of  the  personal  in  the  technical  that  'appears  to  endow 
[scientists] personally with superior objectivity': 
Thus, despite the deep and bitter rivalries that pervade all scientific fields, 
the scientific-technical caste excludes purely charismatic claims to power 
perhaps more absolutely than any other intellectual caste in hi~tory.~" 
In Max Weber's usage, charisma has both pure and hybrid forms. In its 
pure form, charisma - an attributed personal 'gift of grace', the possession 
of pneuma by a recipient of divine inspiration - and associated charismatic 
forms of  authority and organization,  are explicitly contrasted to any form 
of institutional routine and, especially, of  bureaucratic organization. Cha- 
risma meets social needs 'that go beyond those of everyday routine' and, in 
so doing, acts as 'the  specific creative revolutionary force in history'.  In 
times  of  'psychic,  physical,  economic,  ethical,  religious,  [and]  political 
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. . . the  'natural'  leaders  . .  . have  been  neither  officeholders  nor  in-
cumbents of an 'occupation'  . . . The natural leaders in distress have been 
holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been 
believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody. 
It is  the  exceptional,  out-of-the-ordinary  force  of  charisma  that  sets  it 
against 'any kind of bureaucratic organization': 
[Tlhe charismatic  structure  knows  nothing  of  a  form  or  an  ordered 
procedure  of  appointment or dismissal. It knows  no regulated  'career', 
'advancement',  'salary',  or regulated and expert training . . 
A 'disenchanted'  world is  also a world substantially drained of  charisma, 
and bureaucratic forms of organization are implicated in both losses. Weber 
flirted with the conclusion that the career of charisma - thus understood -
is  a marker of  modernity,  charismatic authority definitively belonging to 
The  World We  Have Lost.32 
However, Weber also thought that this pure or personal charisma was 
inherently unstable,  and that charisma - or something he reckoned was 
very like it - could somehow become institutionalized and even routinized, 
as in the ex oficio supernatural authority passed on in apostolic or monar- 
chical  succession. This routinized  charisma  nevertheless  shows  signs of 
dilution: the great potency of pure charisma diminishes as it is institution- 
alized. The social force which is  originally defined as standing outside of 
social institutions is now treated as an integral aspect of institutions. (It is 
in this connection that Clifford Geertz pays evidently non-ironic tribute to 
Weber's  'extraordinary  ability to hold together warring ideas'.)33  This led 
later commentators and apologists towards eclectic positions which further 
fuzz any coherent juxtaposition  of  charisma and institutionalized action. 
'Charisma  and bureaucracy',  Amitai Etzioni writes,  'can be combined to 
varying  degrees.. . . A  structure  might  be  purely  bureaucratic,  or have 
some charismatic positions, or have a large number of such positions, or be 
almost  completely  staffed  by  charismatics  . . .'.?'  Other  sociologists 
acknowledge the r61e of charismatic authority within modern bureaucratic 
structures,  while  arguing  that  this  makes  for  institutional  dysfunction- 
ali~.~' Institutions devoted  to  the  rational  achievement of  instrumental 
ends -and technoscientific organizations would presumably head any such 
list - can only be damaged by the intrusion of charismatic authority.36 
Sociologists sometimes react with dismay when terms of professional 
art are let loose in the wider culture. In such cases, it is said, sociological 
rigour  is  'vulgarized'  in the  mouths  of  the  ignorant laity.  So Reinhard 
Bendix,  for instance,  deplores current 'debased'  usages  of  the notion  of 
charisma: 
Charismatic leadership depends upon a widespread belief in the existence 
of  extraordinary  or  supernatural capacities,  but  such  beliefs  are  at  a 
discount in secular  context^.^' 
Rigorous  expert use  has  become  vague  and vulgar  misuse.  Of  course, 
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or  semantic  link  between Weber's  and  Everyman's  charisma. Without 
Weber's  contributions to academic culture,  it is,  of  course, unlikely that 
atomic scientists  would  have  had the word  'charisma'  available to them 
and,  to that  extent  at  least,  their  vernacular  stands  in  a  genealogical 
relationship with the vocabulary of social-scientific expertise. But to claim 
more than that is  both problematic  and, for our purposes,  unnecessary. 
Los Alamos scientists were performing charisma, not reflecting on it; they 
were building a bomb, not doing social theory. Quite possibly, 'charisma' 
was, for them, just  a fancy or fashionable way of expressing sentiments for 
which alternative, and more traditional, vocabularies already exi~ted.'~  We 
want  not  to worry  whether  Los Alamos  usage  was  properly Weberian. 
We  will  show  that  when  atomic  scientists  referred  to  Oppenheimer's 
charisma - or, indeed, when they used broadly similar vocabulary - they 
were picking out his exceptional  attributes of body and mind, and saying 
that,  in  specific  contexts,  these  attributes  were  powerful  solutions  to 
organizational  problems.  So what special features of  body and mind did 
Los Alamos inhabitants attribute to Oppenheimer? How did they see the 
relationships between those extraordinary features of Oppenheimer's body 
and mind and specific aspects of Los Alamos organizational life? 
Following attributions of charisma delivers us to a series of questions 
now increasingly central to science studies in particular and social science 
in general: how should we conceive of individuals -their attributes and the 
consequences  of  their  actions - in relation to social structures? What is 
the  r61e  of  the  embodied,  the  local,  the  familiar  and  the  face-to-face 
in the technoscientific  systems and institutions of  late modernity? Given 
the interpretative flexibility of organizational rules, how should we account 
for local  order and,  indeed,  how  should  we  conceive such  order? How 
ought we  to describe the moral economy of technoscientific places? What 
are the sources of authority and legitimacy within them, and, by extension, 
of their products?39 
The Face of Charisma 
The topoi through which  Oppenheimer's  associates described his  special 
attributes  turn  out  to  be  remarkably  stable:  they  are  stable  in  their 
recurrence from one commentator to another and, as general descriptors, 
they are also interestingly  stable in their form and function over a great 
span of time in Western culture. Indeed, commentators themselves some- 
times showed awareness of prior uses of these topoi in the historical past, 
thus constructing for themselves a link between premodern culture and the 
technoscientifically modern. These topoi are found in torrents of commen- 
tary on what many associates experienced as Oppenheimer's extraordinary 
features of body, face and gesture, as well as on his manner of living in the 
world  (suave, cosmopolitan, generous and detached),  and on his special 
social, moral and intellectual presence, a presence which was, in turn, often 
associated  with  his bodily  endowments.  Here,  to indicate the texture  of 552  Social Studies of Science 3014 
much of  this  commentary, we  let physiognomical  topoi mark the general 
tone and substance. 
Almost no account of  the force of Oppenheimer's  personal presence 
failed to remark upon his tall and thin bodily frame and, especially, upon 
the colour of  his  eyes  and the intensity  of  his  gaze. Before the War,  his 
Berkeley students were used to what they called the 'blue glare treatment' -
'when aroused',  Goodchild reports,  'Oppenheimer's  eyes seemed to turn 
from a gray-blue to a vivid  blue'.''  Bernice Brode wrote  about his blue 
eyes, which 'had that special intensity, peculiar to him';"  the young son of 
a  Los  Alamos  machine-operator  remembered  'his  blue  eyes  more  than 
anything else. A very gentle man. He had a great smile that would  melt 
me'."  Eleanor Jette, the wife of a Los Alamos metallurgist, referred to his 
'electric  blue  eyes'  in  identifying  Oppenheimer  as  the  individual  'who 
guided the work and wove the threads together';"  Rabi spoke about 'the 
penetrating gaze  of  his  blue  eyes'  which  helped  make him  'a  center of 
attention  in  almost  any  company';44 Roger  Robb,  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission's counsel in the Security Board hearings, expressed his dislike 
of Oppenheimer in physiognomic terms: 'he had the iciest pair of blue eyes 
I  ever  saw';"  and his  one-time  friend Haakon  Chevalier  described him 
as 
. . . tall, nervous and intent. . . . But it was the head  that was the most 
striking:  the halo  of  wispy  black  curly  hair,  the  fine,  sharp nose,  and 
especially the eyes, surprisingly blue, having a strange depth and intensity, 
and yet expressive of a candor that was altogether disarming. He looked 
like a young Einstein, and at the same time like an over-grown choir-boy. 
There was  something both subtly wise  and terribly innocent  about his 
face. It was  an  extraordinarily  sensitive face, which  seemed capable of 
registering and conveying every shade of emotion. 
It was a face that made Chevalier think about glorified faces he had seen in 
paintings:  'I  associated  it with  the faces  of  apostles.. . . A kind  of  light 
shone from  it,  which  illuminated  the  scene  around  him'."  There was 
'something about his eyes [that] gave him a certain aura' (see Figure 
It was a face and a body that summoned up similar images in Robert 
Wilson's  wife Jane. When, towards the end of  the project,  Oppenheimer 
was ill with the chicken pox and reduced to about 11  5 pounds, she thought 
that 'our  thin,  ascetic  Director looked  like  a  15th-century portrait  of a 
saint'.48  He was so thin that 'he has been referred to by geometricians as a 
refugee from a plane geometry textbook', lacking a solid or fleshly dimen- 
sion.''  In describing Oppenheimer, Rabi was reminded of a friend he had 
known as a student at Cornell: 
Physically and perhaps  intellectually  and emotionally, he was very  like 
Oppenheimer. One day he announced: 'I give the lie to the materialist. I 
am a disembodied spirit'. 
'In  Oppenheimer',  Rabi  concluded,  'the  element  of  earthiness was  fee-
ble'.''  The physicist  Leona  Libby  contrasted Enrico Fermi's  earthiness Thorpe (i. Shapin:  Who  Was Oppenheimer? 
FIGURE 1 
Oppenheimer as  Wartime Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory 
Source: LANL 88973 
with 'the poetic, disembodied, spiritual emanations that were the basis for 
Oppenheimer's charisma'."  The biographer of the military director of the 
Manhattan Project describes Oppenheimer as 'frail, almost ethereal'.5"n 
Richard Rhodes'  high-octane prose,  'Oppenheimer's  emaciation suggests 
he had an aversion to incorporating the world. His body embarrassed him 
and he seldom allowed himself to appear,  as at the beach,  undressed'.'' 
Oppenheimer was, another writer said, 'frail to the point of transparency', 
adding that  this  sense  that his  body  was  all  but  absent advertised  and 
appeared to augment Oppenheimer's  intellectual presence: 'The power of 
his personality  is stronger because of the fragility of his person. When he 
speaks he seems to grow, since the largeness of his mind so affirms itself 
that the smallness of his body is f~rgotten'.'~  So Oppenheimer was identi- 
fied,  in  part,  as  an  ascetic,  with  the  moral  authority  that  has  been 
associated  with  the  ascetic  way  of  life  over  a  great  sweep  of  Western 
history.55 
Charisma and Organizational Order 
As participants talked about Oppenheimer's special personal endowments 
of mind and body - his charisma - so they talked about, and constituted, 
organizational order at Los Alamos, and so they offered partial solutions to 
the normative  uncertainties  of  that place. Oppenheimer's  charisma may 
therefore be treated as an interactional accomplishment: the constitution of 
Oppenheimer as charismatic - and as a charismatic of a certain kind in a 
certain context - helped some people (but not others) to say what kind of 
place Los Alamos was and ought to be. To say this is apparently to move 
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headed junctional,  instrumental and naturalistic account of what was organi- 
zationally  accomplished  in  and  through  constituting  Oppenheimer  as 
charismatic. It is a move we do want to make, even as we offer a concluding 
qualification to the scope and legitimacy of this hard-headed  account. 
We  will here talk about Oppenheimer's charisma in connection with a 
series  of  related  practical  organizational  problems  at  Los  Alamos:  its 
identity as a civilian-scientific place versus a military place, and its internal 
organizational structures as these bore  upon fragmentation,  the flow of 
information  and the maintenance of  morale. A point  of  methodological 
principle in science and technology studies is here reinforced by common 
sense: these problems were at once organizational and technical; they bore 
on what people knew, what they were able to do with the knowledge they 
had, how they felt about the organization as a whole, and the nature of the 
commitment they had to the organization's technical goals. We  will sketch 
the nature of these problems and how they presented themselves to various 
participants,  and we  will  then note how  Oppenheimer's  special  gifts of 
body and mind were mobilized as partial solutions to those problems.j6 
The social worlds  of  Los Alamos  were  defined  by  two  fences.  One 
fence marked off a highly secret Army post from the state of New Mexico, 
geographically, legally,  socially and intellectually. Within this  fence there 
was  another which marked  off  the 'Technical Area'  from the Army post 
proper,  thus making a significant distinction between domains of  civilian 
and military authorit4; even while the whole of Los Alamos was formally an 
Army installation. The logic of  military  security dictated  as complete as 
possible a separation of Los Alamos from the rest of the world. The civilian 
scientists lived in a self-sufficient planned community in which their living 
conditions  and  their  basic  needs  were  provided  for  by  the  Army.  Its 
inhabitants ate in mess halls and shopped at the Army Commissary and 
Post  Exchange.  Law  enforcement  was  provided  by  the Military  Police. 
Some services, such as fire protection, developed into a curious mixture of 
civilian and military  authority and responsibility. The Army  also, in the 
interests of morale, provided  cheap beer at the Post Exchange and movie 
nights in a theatre that on Sundays doubled  as a church. What was  not 
provided,  the inhabitants improvised  for themselves,  throwing parties  in 
their homes or dormitories, and clearing trees for their own ski piste.j7This 
is  what  sociologists  might  mean  if  they  saw  in Los Alamos  something 
resembling  Goffman's  'total institutions',  or what its inhabitants gestured 
at when they described Los Alamos as a 'camp~s'.'~ 
Its inhabitants even set up their equivalent  of  'student  government', 
the 'Town Council'. This administered civil regulations dealing, for exam- 
ple, with traffic offences, relying on voluntary cooperation because there 
was no civil court on the post. The legally and socially anomalous character 
of Los Alamos thus threw up surprising forms of institutional improvisa- 
tion. The Technical Area,  inside  the  inner fence,  was  nominally  under 
civilian administration, under a contract with the University of California. 
Oppenheimer was the civilian Scientific Director -one of two heads at Los 
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J.M. Harman, later Colonel W. Ashbridge,  and then Colonel G.R. Tyler). 
However,  Oppenheimer himself,  like  the post  commander,  reported  to 
General Leslie R. Groves of  the Army  Corps of  Engineers,  who was  in 
overall command of the Manhattan Project and who had been responsible 
for selecting Oppenheimer as Scientific Director.'' 
Groves was no merely nominal authority: he maintained close super- 
vision of the technical programme, both by telephone  and teletype from 
Washington  and through frequent site visits. Groves exercised his control 
personally  through Oppenheimer, and also via  the Albuquerque District 
Engineer, the post organization at Los Alamos, and Army and Navy liaison 
officers  assigned to the technical programme. Thus, in practice, 'the role of 
the prime contractor, the University of California, was narrowly confined 
to  the  details  of  business  management  and procurement  for  the  labo- 
ratory',  and  the  nature  of  civilian  versus  military  control  was  never 
organizationally  unambiguous  at  day-to-day  and  issue-by-issue  levels.60 
The inner fence was a highly porous barrier between military and civilian 
authority,  and  it  was  virtually  immaterial  to  Groves.  Oppenheimer's 
vaguely defined position between the scientists and the military matched 
the anomalous and uncertain character of the laboratory, placed in a field 
of tension between military and civilian a~thority.~' 
Nor did the inner fence define an absolute distinction between types of 
personnel. The Corps of  Engineers  furnished  a large proportion  of  the 
laboratory  workforce  through  its  Special  Engineer  Detachment  (SED), 
which  was  established  to  channel  technically  and  scientifically  skilled 
enlisted  men  into  the  Manhattan  Pr~ject.'~ These  military  personnel 
formed a sizeable part of  the laboratory's  workforce. By  May  1945, of  a 
total  laboratory  workforce  of  just  over  2200,  roughly  half  were  SEDs. 
About  a hundred  members  of  the Women's  Army  Corps  (WACS) also 
worked  in the laboratory,  several  as  scientific researchers and others  as 
librarians,  clerks  and telephone  operators.63  The H.E.  (high  explosives) 
programme relied particularly on SEDs, carrying out explosives casting, 
testing  and  research  at  outlying  field  sites. The SEDs,  working  in  the 
laboratory  or at testing  sites  under  civilian group  and division  leaders, 
spent the majority of their working day beyond the reach of their military 
commanders. The position of the SEDs, between the military authority of 
the post  and the civilian  authority  of the laboratory,  was  contested  and 
unclear. At one point, General Groves moved to have junior officers of the 
Corps of Engineers 'put in charge of the enlisted men while the latter work 
at  the various  Sites  used  by  the  H.E.  Project'.  The head  of  the H.E. 
programme,  the  chemist  George  Kistiakowsky, wrote  to  Oppenheimer 
strongly objecting to this. Scientific expertise and responsibility, on the one 
hand, and military rank, on the other, are unlikely to be commensurate, he 
argued: 'It  is very doubtful whether young officers can be obtained with 
research experience at  least  equivalent  to a PhD degree.  Consequently, 
these officers will not be superior in their technical training and experience 
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Kistiakowsky pointed out the danger of 'a  state of divided authority [on the 
testing sites] which cannot but result in damage to progress'.64 
It appears that Kistiakowsky's opposition was decisive in this case, and, 
in general, the ability of the SEDs to perform their r6le in the laboratory 
effectively was given priority over the enforcement of normal Army proce- 
dures. In an early 1945 conference of senior Corps of Engineers staff at 
Los Alamos,  the  question was  raised  of  whether  the  SEDs were  being 
'subjected to too much military work'. This idea was dismissed by Major 
T.O. Palmer  who,  after  becoming  commanding  officer  of  the  SED in 
August  1944, had eliminated required morning reveille and callisthenics. 
Given these reforms, he did 'not see how the SEDs could have any fewer 
military d~ties'.~'  An Army psychiatrist, reporting on the 'mental hygiene' 
of the Los Alamos community, noted in passing that 'The S.E.D. cannot 
be regarded as regular  soldiers, having been segregated soon after enlist- 
ment for specific jobs  because of  specialized education. The work under 
civilian  administrators  places  military  regulations  as  secondary  to  the 
scientific program'. This 'anomalous situation' of the SED was, in his view, 
a 'knotty ~ne'.'~  As former SEDs have put it, 'This was the least military of 
any military outfit I have ever been in. Now I understand that other units, 
the construction group and the MPs [Military Police], were really G.I., but 
not us. We were quite un-G.I. . . .Tech Area pressure kept the military from 
interfering  and  trying  to  make  us  G.I'."'  The position  of  the  SED, 
instantiating  the  often  confused  division  between  civilian  and  military 
authority, was just  one example among many of the normative uncertainty 
pervading life at Los Alamos. 
This uncertainty was increased by the rapid growth of the Los Alamos 
population which,  throughout the War,  continued to outstrip both plans 
and provisions. In February  1945, a post administrator  complained that 
the increase in population 'taxes practically all our facilities beyond capac- 
ity'."  Construction  on the project  began  in January  1943 with  approx- 
imately 1500 workers. Scientific personnel began to arrive on a permanent 
basis  in March  1943 and,  by  the  end  of  the year,  the population  had 
reached an estimated 3500. This rose to 5675 by December 1944, and by 
June  1945 the total population  had reached  a wartime peak of  approx- 
imately 8750.'~  These figures stand in marked contrast with early projec- 
tions, by Oppenheimer and his fellow physicists, about the likely scale of 
the project. Oppenheimer's  original guess was that perhaps as few as six 
scientists (or, with support personnel, several hundred) might do the job.7" 
The physicist Hugh Bradner has told us that, when he was recruited for the 
project in winter  1943, the anticipated number of scientists was between 
30  and  70."  Both  the  laboratory  and  the  post  expanded  beyond  all 
expectations as new configurations of  scientific knowledge, technological 
activity and organizational form were thrown up as emergent properties of 
the work. The forms  that had  been  loosely envisaged  as  appropriate to 
relatively small numbers of scientists had been replaced  by those necessi- 
tated by a large, highly differentiated workforce. The transformation was 
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Throughout the War,  the organization of  Los Alamos was  in a con- 
tinual state of flux and turbulence. The production and display of organiza- 
tional charts were interesting to participants as symbolic representations of 
coherence and stable order amid uncertainty and change (see Figure 2). So 
the mathematician  Stanislaw Ulam writes of the Los Alamos 'fascination 
with  organizational  charts.  At  meetings  . . . whenever  an organizational 
chart was  displayed,  I could  feel  the whole  audience  come to life with 
pleasure at seeing something concrete and definite'."  This symbolic dis- 
play  of  coherence was  one way  of  making the organization  appear legit- 
imate  and  functional. The informal  everyday  life  of  the  laboratory,  of 
course, massively belied the neat divisions and lines of authority displayed 
on such charts and the status of these representations vis-a-vis quotidian 
organizational  realities  was  ~ncertain.'~ The problem  of  keeping  pace 
organizationally with rapid change and expansion was  faced not only by 
the laboratory, but also by the post, in its work of ministering to the needs 
of  the laboratory  and the community. For example,  Colonel Tyler, who 
became  post  commander  early in  1945, was  moved  to say  at  one post 
FIGURE 2 
An Organization Chart for the Los Alamos Laboratory, dating from early March 1943 
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The chart shows the situation of Oppenheimer in relation to the civilian  authority- of J.B.  
Conant, on the one hand, and the military authority of General Groves, on the other. This  
chart also shows Oppenheimer as head of the Theoretical Division. This dual responsibility  
for Oppenheimer was abandoned by  the time the laboratory began operation. Subsequent  
charts (e.g. LANL A-81-019  34-17)  also dispensed  with the distinction, maintained here,  
between  research  and application, and demonstrate the further differentiation of divisions  
into groups.  
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administration meeting 'that he had been unable to find any organizational 
chart which had any meaning'.74 
Military control of Los Alamos posed several kinds of practical organi- 
zational and technical problems for its scientific inhabitants. Given overall 
communal dedication to beating the Nazis to the Bomb - at least for those 
inhabitants who knew what the Project was  all about - military-imposed 
censorship  and  secrecy  was  not  one  of  them  (the  spy  Klaus  Fuchs 
excepted). Richard Feynman liked to play games showing up the silliness 
and inefficiency of  security measures,  and other scientists bridled  at the 
mandated name-changes  (Farmer for Fermi, Baker for Bohr) (see Figure 
3)."  But, in the main, even those inclined to the view that nuclear secrets 
might  properly  be  conveyed to  all the Allies  accepted  the  necessity  of 
secrecy. Robert  Serber enthusiastically  took  on the job  of  intentionally 
spreading disinformation  about activities 'on  the hill'  in local saloons -
thought by the military to be crawling with spies - though he came away 
impressed with the difficulty of getting anyone even to listen." 
The problems that some scientists saw with military control lay, rather, 
with the organizational forms thought to be preferred by the military, and 
with  the  effects these  forms  might  have  on the  technical  programme's 
internal  flow  of  information,  the  effective  distribution  of  human  and 
material resources, the morale of the laboratory and the effective commit- 
ment of  its scientific members. Military forms of  organization  were not 
only unpleasant  and antithetical  to  scientific custom,  they  also - in the 
opinion of these  scientists - posed potential  obstacles  to the speed with 
which the Bomb could be built, if not to its eventual construction. It was in 
these  connections  that  significant  features  of  Oppenheimer's  charisma 
offered substantial solutions to organizational problems. 
By  midsummer 1943, the basic organizational structure of the techni- 
cal programme was in place. There were four technical divisions: Theoret- 
ical, Experimental Physics, Chemistry and Metallurgy, and Ordnance and 
Engineering. Between autumn 1943 and summer  1944, all the divisions 
expanded. By  1944, the largest division was Ordnance and Engineering, 
headed  by  the Naval  Ordnance specialist,  Captain William  S. ('Deak') 
Parsons."  Within each division, groups and sections,  usually of  between 
five  and  ten  people,  worked  on  specialized  problems.78 Group leaders 
reported to Division leaders who reported in turn to Oppenheimer. The 
organization was  thus functionally differentiated  and had a formal hier- 
archy  and division  of  labour. After  summer  1944, the laboratory  grew 
faster and its division of labour became more complex. 
In August  1944, there was  an important  shift in work  dedicated to 
methods  of  bomb  assembly  and  detonation. The so-called  implosion 
method  had  originally been  a marginal  effort  but,  because  of  changing 
understandings of the rate of neutron emission in plutonium, and because 
of the nature of the material being produced at Hanford, implosion came 
to be given much higher  priority than the originally envisaged, but rela- 
tively slow, gun method. Parsons' Ordnance Division continued to work on 
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FIGURE 3 
A Page from the Military Police Identification Book 
Hans Bethe  and his  wife,  Rose,  are shown  at the top. The bottom  left  photograph is  of  
Priscilla Greene Duffield,  Oppenheimer's  personal secretary. Residents and personnel were  
also fingerprinted.  
Source: LANL 78-9706.  
and other divisions to create a new  Explosives (X)  Division,  under the 
chemist George Kistiakowsky, to work  intensively on the high  explosive 
implosion  method  for  the  plutonium  ~eapon.'~  From  this  point,  the 
engineering work of Los Alamos was bifurcated in a major way. 
In July  1945,  the  Explosives Division  made  up  about  20%  of  the 
laboratory's workforce and was itself divided into 16 groups, many of these 
themselves  subdivided into specialized  sections.  Its personnel  were  also 
geographically  dispersed,  some work  being  done  in  the main  technical 560  Social  Studies  of Science  3014 
area, while a large number carried out high explosives work at the outlying 
S-Site, and at Anchor Ranch testing ranges."  Similarly, the Experimental 
Physics Division was split into gun and implosion programmes, the new R 
Division for gun research and the G (or 'Gadget') Division for implosion 
work. By July 1945, the implosion work under G and X Divisions engaged 
the efforts of almost 35%)of the laboratory's  personnel. The other large 
divisions were Chemistry and Metallurgy, the Machine Shops, and Admin- 
istration.  Personnel  demands created  by  the as-yet-uncertain  implosion 
method, as well as the shift towards engineering in the final phase of the 
project, led to the large increase in the number and proportion of enlisted 
SEDs in  the  laboratory.  By  the  end of  the War,  the  laboratory  was  a 
formally  hierarchical,  highly  differentiated  and  instrumentally  directed 
scientific-engineering organization. 
Such an organization, developing so quickly and under such ambig- 
uous  control,  posed  all  sorts  of  mundane  problems  of  direction  and 
management.  Oppenheimer was,  of  course,  its  Scientific Director,  and 
therefore  the last  court of  appeal  for  the  scientists,  though  the  precise 
nature of his authority vis-il-uis General Groves remained uncertain. But 
even in an organization as problematic, contested and rapidly changing as 
Los  Alamos  there  was  much  institutional  routine,  as  well  as  personal 
authority. Overall coordination  was  effected by a framework of  commit- 
tees, while formally structured meetings aimed to produce integration at a 
number  of  points  in  the  organizational  hierarchy.  At  the  top  of  the 
structure was the Governing Board. This was established to advise Oppen- 
heimer,  but  it  came  to  make  policy  it~elf.~'  The Board  consisted  of 
Division leaders,  key  administrative  personnel  and those with important 
liaison functions. Through its members it received reports from the Divi- 
sions of Los Alamos itself, as well  as liaison information from the other 
sites of the Manhattan Project. The Governing Board was the main policy- 
making and coordinating body of Los Alamos and it set technical policy, 
for example,  in giving priority to implosion. The Board also dealt with a 
wide range of administrative problems, from salary scales to relations with 
the Army post. Indeed, in June 1944, Oppenheimer decided that the Board 
was too burdened with 'non-technical'  matters and disbanded it, dividing 
its work between a new Technical Board and an Administrative Board. 
Technical discussions in the Governing Board, due to its wide range of 
responsibilities,  were necessarily at a fairly high level of  abstraction from 
day-to-day  technical work. The potentially  problematic gap between the 
particular and the general was meant to be mitigated by the Coordinating 
Council, including group as well  as division leaders. The Council's task 
was geared towards integrating specialized technical work at a greater level 
of participation and concrete detail. The next level of intended integration 
was the Colloquium, a weekly forum open to all scientifically qualified staff 
members. At Colloquia the staff heard reports from the different parts of 
the laboratory and were expected to contribute suggestions to work outside 
their  own  special  fields  of  competence.  It was  in  the  Colloquia  that 
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going  on in  different parts  of  the  laboratory:  the  establishment  of  the 
Colloquia responded at once to concerns over morale,  over hierarchical 
authority  and  over  the  efficient  flow  of  technical  information  and  the 
efficient mobilization of e~pertise.~' 
Formally,  the laboratory was hierarchically  organized,  its work inte- 
grated at the top and directed from the top. However, the Colloquium, in 
particular, expressed and institutionalized an egalitarian or collegial order 
whereby integration and cross-communication took place at lower levels of 
the organization,  and through face-to-face interaction rather than through 
formal, written reports. While the laboratory's  organizational structure into 
Divisions  and  Groups  was  hierarchical  and  functionally  differentiated, 
there were competing impulses in the day-to-day operation  of  the labo- 
ratory. The social order of Los Alamos was in tension between competing 
definitions  of  the  situation.  To  what  extent  was  the  laboratory  to  be 
hierarchical  and instrumental,  and to  what  extent  egalitarian  and aca-
demic?  This tension was never resolved, and these opposing desires for the 
organizational  and moral order of Los Alamos competed for the duration 
of the ~roject.'~ 
As  the hub and nerve-centre of  the Manhattan Project, Los Alamos 
was  created  as  a  means  of  both  enhancing  and  controlling  the  flow  of 
technical information. Los Alamos was to be both a microcosm of Scien- 
tific Community and a place where the scientists could be controlled and 
their  work  formally  monitored.  Before  the  creation  of  the  Los Alamos 
laboratory,  and  with  the  hope  of  specifying requirements  for  the  new 
weapon,  research  on fast neutron reactions  was  carried  out under  the 
umbrella of the Office of  Scientific Research  and Development  (OSRD). 
By  1942, research sites were dispersed throughout the country. Initially 
under the directorship of the theoretical physicist Gregory Breit, problems 
with his temperament and administrative abilities led to his resignation and 
replacement by Oppenheimer. Working under Oppenheimer, it then fell to 
the experimentalist John Manley to coordinate the research taking place at 
the Carnegie Institution, the University  of  Minnesota,  the University  of 
Wisconsin, the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, the 
University  of  California  at Berkeley,  Cornell University,  Stanford  Uni- 
versity and the Rice Institute, and to relay information back to Oppenhei- 
mer's theoretical group at Berkeley. Manley spent summer 1942 shuttling 
between these sites. But it did not take long for him, Oppenheimer, A.H. 
Compton and J.B. Conant to decide that this was no way to run a project. 
They recommended the centralization of fast neutron research in a single 
site.R4  Its isolation  and geography made northern New Mexico  a strong 
candidate for the site. Jemez Springs was suggested by the man from the 
Army  Corps of  Engineers  sent to survey possible  sites, but was  turned 
down by Groves and Oppenheimer. It was  Oppenheimer who  suggested 
nearby  Los Alam~s.~'  Oppenheimer knew  the  area  well  from  boyhood 
holidays which he regularly spent at a ranch in the neighbouring moun- 
tains. This relationship of  Oppenheimer to northern New Mexico - his 
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be so by many participants who knew of his personal  connection  to the 
place. It was felt to give Oppenheimer a kind of symbolic ownership. It was 
his place in that sense, as in others.86 
One of Breit's legacies in the OSRD-run uranium project was a system 
of organizational 'compartmentalization'.  This involved strict regulation of 
the  flow  of  information  between  sites  and between  participants  in  the 
project.  As  the historian  Stanley Goldberg put  it,  'each  task  was  to  be 
performed in a cubicle  isolated  from all the other cubicles'.  Breadth  of 
knowledge  increased  with  position  in  the  administrative  hierarchy,  but 
'virtually  no one save for those in the office of the overall director would 
have  a  perspective  on the  entire  project'.87 Compartmentalization was 
widely judged by scientists to be a routine feature of military organizational 
patterns, to be informed by understandable security considerations, but to 
be potentially destructive of the project's goals. Accordingly, compartmen- 
talization was offensive to many of the scientists, who insisted upon both 
the civility and the technical necessity  of  free,  informal communication 
among specialized researchers. Professional networks and friendship net- 
works often mapped on to one another. Compartmentalization formalized 
the structure of communication and imposed an alien hierarchy. 
So  said  the  physicist  Leo  Szilard  late  in  1942,  then  working  at 
Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory: compartmentalization caused 'strain' 
and 'embarrassment' between 'old friends' such as himself and Teller when 
they found themselves ordered to withhold information from one another. 
It 'poisons the discussion'  even over areas not explicitly restricted. Accord- 
ing to Szilard, this interference with scientists'  friendship relationships led 
to  misunderstandings  in technical communication."  Compartmentaliza-
tion  simultaneously distorted proper moral  order and effective technical 
order.  Its  incivilities  caused  technical  inefficiencies. The tensions  over 
secrecy in the Manhattan Project were, therefore, conflicts over the nature 
and shape  of  social bonds  and over proper organizational  forms. These 
were  conflicts  about  whether  the  social  order  was  to  be  informal  and 
collegial or formal and hierarchical or, more precisely, what combination 
of the two it should be. Technical compartmentalization both presupposed 
and produced the formalization and differentiation of social relationships. 
Compartmentalization was,  to be  sure, driven  by  security concerns. 
General Groves said that 'Compartmentalization of knowledge, to me, was 
the very heart of  security'. But it also concerned control over work, and 
Groves  clearly envisaged compartmentalization  as providing  a means of 
imposing elements of  military-industrial work-discipline. The system, he 
said, 
. . . not  only provided  an adequate measure  of  security,  but  it  greatly 
improved over-all efficiency by making our people stick to their knitting. 
And  it  made  quite  clear  to  all  concerned  that  the  project  existed  to 
produce a specific end product - not to enable individuals to satisfy their 
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Compartmentalization defined scientists'  work in instrumental or utilitar- 
ian terms and this,  in turn, defined  a structure of  control and authority. 
Instrumental goals were formulated at the highest rungs of the Manhattan 
District,  and  the  scientists  were  to  labour  to  realize  these  externally 
determined ends."  Rabi,  who consulted for Los Alamos while primarily 
working on radar at MIT, recognized the close connection between hier- 
archy,  instrumentality  and  control  over  information. Angered  that  the 
Navy requested that he develop a device without deeming it necessary to 
tell him its tactical uses, he lectured his military superiors: 'Now look, you 
bring your man who understands radar, you bring your man who under- 
stands  the  navy,  who  understands  aircraft,  you  bring  your  man  who 
understands tactics,  and then we'll  talk about your needs'.  According  to 
Rabi, 'That was a pretty hard thing for them to swallow', but it 'started  a 
relationship with the navy that was important to us . . . me  came to be 
friends  with  great  mutual  respect'."  Rabi  sought  to  establish  the  re-
searchers  as  equal  partners  of  the  military,  rather  than  employees  or 
technicians, and access to information was essential in this. 
'Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man': Making a Natural 
Leader 
We  have now briefly described several closely related organizational  pre- 
dicaments confronting Los Alamos scientists: was Los Alamos character- 
istically a civilian-scientific or a military place? What organizational forms 
were  most  appropriate to  executing its  intended  technical  tasks? What 
forms were most  conducive to the efficient flow  of  information  and the 
maintenance of high morale? Answers to these questions were unstable: in 
important  areas of  Los Alamos life you could not appeal to the routines 
appropriate to  a  specific kind  of  place  just  because the identity of  Los 
Alamos  as a specific kind  of  place  was  always uncertain and potentially 
contested. It was in this context that Oppenheimer's charisma proved such 
a powerful organizational resource for his scientific associates. 
The first thing to appreciate about Oppenheimer and his charismatic 
authority is that few, if any, colleagues predicted his success as a leader of a 
large organization, and several had forebodings of failure. If Oppenheimer 
was, as Rabi and others said, a 'natural leader', then his natural leadership 
had to be both individually and collectively achieved. (Indeed, Rabi, as we 
will note, was one of the people who helped Oppenheimer achieve natural 
leadership.)  Although many commentators noted  Oppenheimer's  prewar 
cosmopolitanism,  suavity  and  personal  generosity  (supported  by  his 
family's  enormous wealth), his charm and intensity, and the tendency of 
his students to ape his every mannerism, nothing about that personality led 
anyone to find his appointment to the scientific directorship of Los Alamos 
anything but  ~urprising.~~  John Manley was  'astonish[edI7 by  the 'rapid 
transformation of this theorist . . . into a most effective leader and admin- 
istrator' as the laboratory's work got underway. Manley wondered whether 
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'in areas for which his previous activity had given so few objective hints for 
the future'."  Luis Alvarez relates that E.O. Lawrence  supported Oppen- 
heimer's  appointment as Director 'when  some of  Robert's closest friends 
were skeptical. "He couldn't run a hamburger stand", I heard one of them 
~a~'.~"abi  himself  said  that  Oppenheimer  'was  absolutely  the  most 
unlikely  choice  for  a  laboratory  director  imaginable':  'He  was  a  very 
impractical sort of fellow. He walked about with scuffed shoes and a funny 
hat, and, more important, he didn't know anything about equipment'.9i 
Samuel Allison, a physicist from the University of Chicago, was called 
in by Oppenheimer to advise on organization. He was appalled by the state 
of Oppenheimer's preparation: 
Just before Christmas of  1942, Oppenheimer asked me to come and help 
plan  the preliminary  layout.. . . On the Il/lesa he  and I  sat  down  and 
planned  the laboratory.  He showed me what  he  called  an organization 
chart for a hundred personnel. I looked at it and felt sure that something 
was wrong, but I didn't  know what. The best I could do was to poke at 
random, 'Where are the shipping clerks?' I asked. He gave me a thought- 
ful sympathetic look, 'We're not going to ship anything',  he answered. I 
completely underestimated the size of the installation but not so much as 
he did."" 
Manley was also concerned that a definite organizational structure had not 
been  settled.  He found  Oppenheimer  'about  as  unresponsive  to  such 
mundane matters as an experimentalist would  expect a theoretical phys- 
icist to be, perhaps more so'. At one point, Manley's urging seemed to have 
had  an  effect.  In January  1943,  exhausted  from  work  and  travelling, 
Manley visited Oppenheimer in Berkeley: 'I had scarcely opened the door 
when he shoved a paper at me, saying "Here's your damned organization 
chart!" '."  However, this did not put an end to administrative  problems. 
When Wilson  made  a  visit  to  Los  Alamos  in  March,  to  inspect  the 
construction, he  found the site  in  a very  poor  state  and building work 
behind schedule. Following the trip, Wilson and Manley met with Oppen- 
heimer in Berkeley, to inform him of the project's 'state of chaos': 
Manley and I nagged at Oppy all day about his indecisiveness. We  insisted 
that he had decisions to be made. . . .We wanted to know who was to be in 
charge of what, not just  vague talk about the scientific problems nor even 
vaguer  ideas  about democracy. There were  immediate problems  to  be 
faced, and from our point of view Oppy was not facing up to them.'" 
When the two experimentalists pressed him to get on with organizational 
planning, 
Oppenheimer became extremely  angry. He began to use vile language, 
asking us why we  were telling him of these insignificant problems, that it 
was none of our business, and so on. Both of us were scared to death. We 
were frightened because, if this was the leader and, if the leader was going 
to have a tantrum to resolve a problem, then how was anything going to 
get sorted? So we  withdrew, John and I, and discussed some more, and 
decided  that we  would  take  more  initiative and not  look for  so much 
leadership from O~py.~~ Thorpe t3  Shapin: IVho IVas  Oppenheimer? 
Rabi agreed with Wilson that Oppenheimer 
. . . was not a strong character. He was  indecisive, and definitely not a 
fighter. If  he  couldn't  persuade  you,  he'd  cave  in,  especially to  group 
opposition.  Groves,  on the other hand,  could provide  him with  strong 
backbone in the form of consistent policy.  loo 
General Groves himself had grave misgivings about Oppenheimer as 
Director,  even while  acknowledging that Oppenheimer 'knew  everything 
that was then known' about the relevant physics: 'My own feeling was that 
he was well qualified to handle the theoretical aspects of the work, but how 
he would do on the practical experimentation, or how he would handle the 
administrative  responsibilities,  I  had  no idea'.  Oppenheimer just  didn't 
have any administrative experience. Moreover, lacking a Nobel Prize - or, 
indeed, any single towering scientific achievement to his name -there were 
doubts about his authority. Lawrence at Berkeley, Urey at Columbia and 
Compton at Chicago were all Nobelists: 'There was a strong feeling among 
most of the scientific people with whom I discussed  the matter that the 
head  of  Project Y  should  also  be  one'.  Because  of  this  attitude,  and 
'because of the prevailing sentiment that he would not succeed, there was 
considerable opposition to my naming him'.""  Groves just  couldn't find 
anyone better. '02 
Worried about Oppenheimer's Ivory Tower tendencies, Groves insisted 
that he take on an industrial scientist as 'No. 1 assistant'. It was Edward U. 
Condon (from Westinghouse Research Laboratories) who was meant to be 
'the  one to establish  the working rules  and the administrative  scientific 
rules in the establishment, while Dr. Oppenheimer was thinking about how 
was  the actual scientific work  to be done'.lo3  As  it turned out, however, 
Condon abruptly resigned  in April  1943 - interestingly,  citing obsessive 
concerns with compartmentalization and security -and Oppenheimer took 
on primary responsibility for both 'administration'  and 'scientific work'.'('4 
Oppenheimer himself was soon daunted by the job  he had taken on, and 
by  summer  1943 the  nuclear  physicist  Robert  Bacher  found  him  'de- 
pressed with the magnitude and the complexity of the director's  task'. He 
told  Bacher  he  could  not go  through with  it,  but  Bacher's  advice was 
simple: 'Oppenheimer had no alternative,  for no one else could  do the 
job'.""  Nalve, inexperienced, otherworldly, obscure, oracular, emotional, 
quirky, and sometimes acerbic, Oppenheimer was, so to speak, far from a 
natural 'natural leader' of a large community of scientists and engineers. 
Among  the  many  handicaps  he  brought  to  his  Directorship,  the 
statutory  authority  he  derived  from  being  General  Groves'  appointee 
carried  with  it  its  own  problems.  Early  on,  Oppenheimer was  himself 
enthusiastic about the idea of Los Alamos as a military installation and its 
scientific inhabitants as military personnel. In that respect, he was, and was 
seen to be, the General's man, and Oppenheimer's  evident early expres- 
sions of keenness for militarization  may have influenced Groves'  decision 
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Oppenheimer's  unique  compliance with  what  for  him  was  one of  the 
linchpins  of  bomb  lab  planning  may  have  been  the  deciding,  if  not 
the overwhelming, consideration in determining that the physicist was 'the 
best man, the only man' for the director's job.''" 
Groves intended, and Oppenheimer agreed, that the higher-ranking scien- 
tists at Los Alamos 'should  be made members of the Army with officers' 
rank' .107  c I would have been glad to be an officer', Oppenheimer said, and 
he fancied himself in khaki, visiting the Presidio in San Francisco to begin 
enrolling  as  a  Lieutenant  Colonel,  even  taking his  enlistment  physical 
examination.  'He'd  become  very  patriotic',  Wilson  observed.lo8 Alvarez 
noted how quickly 'the  unworldly  and long-haired  prewar  Robert'  met-
amorphosed in appearance as well as in manner. Robert and Jane Wilson 
thought that the length of  Oppenheimer's  hair reflected the various rales 
which he assumed throughout his life. So, as a 'young radical professor at 
Berkeley . . . his hair was all little black curls. And then he was much more 
subdued at Los Alamos, the curls were not so curly'. According to Alvarez, 
at Los Alamos Oppenheimer's  'hair-cut was almost as short as a military 
officer's . . .' (see Figure 4).'09 
But  Oppenheimer  quickly  found  himself  almost  alone  among Los 
Alamos  scientists - or  those  he hoped  to  recruit - in his  attitudes  to 
militarization. And  a situation  developed  in which the scientists  needed 
Oppenheimer to act as a champion -against Groves and against militariza- 
tion.  So to  speak,  they  needed  Oppenheimer  to be  Oppenheimer  (see 
Figure 5).The first time Robert Serber met Groves was in Oppenheimer's 
Berkeley office in October 1942.The General's behaviour there stuck in his 
mind: 
Groves came in with a colonel in tow. . . . He walked in, unbuttoned his 
tunic, took it off, handed it to [the colonel], and said, 'Take this and find T1zorpe G' Shapin:WhoWas Oppenheirner? 
FIGURE 5 
Contrasting Personalities 
Oppenheimer and Groves  are shown  revisiting the site of  the Trinity atomic bomb test  at  
Alamogordo, NIM.  In front of them is what remained of the tower on which the bomb was  
mounted.  
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a dry cleaner and get it cleaned'. Treating a colonel like an errand boy, 
That was Groves's way."" 
And a colonel under Groves is what Oppenheimer initially wanted to be. 
Rabi was one of the physicists'  leaders in putting steel in Oppenheimer's 
backbone.  Rabi had already  seen how these things played  out at MIT's 
Radiation Laboratory and didn't  like what he saw.  He and Bacher both 
threatened to dissociate  themselves from the project if  military  forms of 
organization were adopted. When, in January  1943, they winkled  out of 
Oppenheimer the information that he had in effect already agreed that the 
laboratory be under military control, 'with scientists taking commissions in  '  the Army, we were horrified'. 
Their main  objection was  that the formal hierarchy  of  the military 
would  damage scientific communication,  including scientists'  freedom to 
criticize superiors in rank. They told Oppenheimer 'that lieutenant colonels 
didn't have anything to say,  and that if  he tried  to establish  a scientific 
laboratory [with] a hierarchy that was composed of military people, that it 
just  plain wouldn't  work'.  Rabi said: 'We  knew the military. We'd  been 
engaged in making military things, had the military around us. We  knew it 
wouldn't work. In the first place, none of us would c~me'."~  Oppenheimer 
wrote to Conant what he had been told by McMillan, Bacher and Alvarez, 
as well as by Rabi: 
That the Laboratory must demilitarize: the arguments here were first that 
a divided personnel would inevitably lead to friction, and to a collapse of 
Laboratory morale, complicated in our case by social cleavage, and, more 
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superiors, the whole Laboratory would be forced to follow their instruc- 
tions and thus in effect lose its scientific autonomy."' 
From the perspective  of  the military  establishment,  Rabi's  'determined 
position' in demanding civilian laboratory control was a serious nuisance. 
After the War, General Groves claimed that 'Dr. Rabi's influence was such 
that many of the troubles in the operations of the Los Alamos laboratory 
stemmed from his original stance'."" 
Rabi played Aristotle to Oppenheimer's Alexander, tutoring him in his 
new  r61e  as moral and instrumental leader of  the Los Alamos  scientific 
community. 'Rabi made Oppenheimer more practical',  Bethe recalls: 'He 
talked Oppie out of putting on uniform'.  'Without Rabi',  in Bethe's view, 
the project 'would have been a mess'.l15That is one indication of the extent 
to which  military  and scientists'  assessments  of  organizational  efficiency 
diverged. It was the opposition of men like Rabi and Bacher that consti- 
tuted Oppenheimer as the kind of man who could and would  effectively 
press his military superiors for a civilian form of organization. Oppenhei- 
mer wrote  to Conant that  his  own  'efforts  to  persuade  the men'  that 
militarization would  not entail the loss of  scientific autonomy had been 
'unsuccessful'. He warned that 'the solidarity of physicists is such' that, if 
the  laboratory  remained  military,  not only would  those  from MIT not 
come, but that many others would back out of the project.'16 Conant and 
Groves acquiesced, and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory became (as 
it remains) a formally civilian organization, under the management of the 
University of California. 
However,  throughout  the War  its  status was  unsure.  Conant's  and 
Groves'  letter  to  Oppenheimer,  formalizing  the duties  of  the  Scientific 
Director,  stipulated that the laboratory would become a military installa- 
tion once the work passed from scientific to large-scale ordnance work and 
the 'handling of highly dangerous material'. ' I 7   Bacher's letter accepting his 
position  included  his  resignation  effective the  date  the  laboratory  was 
militarized. This change in the status of the laboratory never materialized: 
the laboratory shifted from scientific to ordnance work without formally 
changing  its  status  or control. The ambiguity  was  also inherent  in  the 
position  of  Oppenheimer,  who  was  statutorily  responsible  to  General 
Groves. The definition of the situation, throughout the War, was contested 
and,  as  that  contest  played  out,  so Oppenheimer became  the personal 
embodiment of the virtues of scientific forms of organization,  the paladin 
of the physicists against the generals and the G-men. During a Coordinat- 
ing Council meeting,  the Army's  security officer,  Colonel Peer de Silva, 
complained of the lack of respect shown him a by young SED who sat on 
the edge of his desk. Oppenheimer replied that 'In this laboratory anybody 
can sit on anybody  else's  desk',  and de Silva, according to the account, 
'was ~lamrned'."~  Oppenheimer was good to his word - a young scientist 
found that 'His office was always open and each of us could walk in, sit on 
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improved'.ll"n  a situation of competing and conflicting norms, Oppen- 
heimer gave voice to, and signalled in more subtle ways, a definition of the 
situation which made it legitimate to act in ways contrary to militaristic or 
bureaucratic codes of behaviour. The charismatic vocabulary of extraordi- 
nary personal openness, collegiality and sympathy attached to Oppenhei- 
mer plausibly traces back to just  this organizational  setting. His scientific 
colleagues helped Oppenheimer be the kind of person who embodied their 
values,  just  because there was  no one else who  could effectively ensure 
limits on the militarization of the laboratory. 
Interestingly,  when the laboratory became increasingly 'weaponized', 
and organizationally  routinized,  in late  1944 and throughout  1945, Los 
Alamos scientists did not generally link these developments to Oppenhei- 
mer's personal leadership. Having associated Oppenheimer with collegial- 
ity and consensus-building rather than coercion, they continued to do so, 
attributing countervailing tendencies  to others in  the organization. This 
dissociation was itself, on reflection, seen partly as a product of Oppenhei- 
mer's  special personal  gifts, the apparent effortlessness  of  his  power  to 
persuade. John Manley, Oppenheimer's right-hand man in setting up Los 
Alamos,  claims that Oppenheimer 'had  no great reluctance  about using 
people', but that he could make this an 'enjoyable experience' in which one 
found oneself freely collaborating: 'It was like a ballet .. . each one knowing 
the part and the role he's playing, and there wasn't any subterfuge in it'.''" 
But Oppenheimer's  attributed ability to direct on the basis of  consensus 
rather  than  coercion  was  also  due to  his  institutional  separation  from 
instrumental functions. Enforcement of schedules and policy decisions was 
deputized down the line to division leaders such as Bethe,  Kistiakowsky, 
Parsons  and Bacher. Teller,  a year  and a half  after  the end of  the War, 
described Bacher as 'a great administrator'  who 'loves organization charts 
and loves  reports  in  proper  shape  and  [who] is  completely  devoted  to 
priorities'. 'To Oppy',Teller said, 'he was the ideal yes-man'.'"  Parsons, in 
particular,  pressed  Oppenheimer to create a committee with  powers  to 
enforce schedules and design  decisions. The 'ruthless,  brutal people'  so 
empowered 'must feel that they have a mandate to circumvent or crush 
opposition above and below . .  .'.''"he  so-called 'Cowpuncher Commit- 
tee', chaired by Samuel Allison, was set up in March 1945 to 'ride herd' on 
these final stages of  the implosion programme. Allison, also head  of  the 
Technical and Scheduling Conference, became Oppenheimer's  'whip'  to 
enforce  work-schedules  in  the  final  engineering  stages  of  the  pro-
gramme."?  Deputizing  such  responsibilities  meant  that  Oppenheimer 
himself was largely associated not with coercive, instrumental and routiniz- 
ing tendencies  in the organization,  but rather with  attempts to generate 
solidarity through face-to-face interaction. The historian Lillian Hoddeson 
has commented on the co-existence at Los Alamos of mission-directedness 
with a strong 'sense of free inquiry'.lZ4  It was an aspect of Oppenheimer's 
charismatic authority among the scientists to be largely dissociated  from 
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Omnipresence and Omniscience: Oppenheimer Knows It All 
So one practical organizational context in which Oppenheimer's  charisma 
cashed out in functional terms was  concern over the implementation  of 
vertical forms of authority, a command structure subjecting scientists  to 
military discipline and control. Yet military control was also feared to work 
its effects on horizontal forms of  organization,  blocking the free flow of 
information  between  specialized  colleagues.  And  here,  too,  the  inter-
actional constitution of Oppenheimer as charismatic featured importantly. 
Just as Oppenheimer was personally dissociated from weaponization,  and 
its attendant organizational  forms, so his special gifts of  body and mind 
were  specially invoked  in the context  of  those  features  of  Los Alamos 
scientific life that made for solidarity and integration. 
The Colloquium, more than any other local organizational form, was 
understood both to express and to enable that solidarity and integration. 
Los Alamos  scientists were,  almost without  exception,  highly concerned 
that each should have an overall sense of how their specialized work fitted 
into the specialized work being done by others, and into the instrumental 
goals  of  the laboratory  as  a whole.  Information,  they reckoned,  should 
circulate throughout the laboratory as efficiently as practicable. Concern 
with information flow was heightened due to its contrast and conflict with 
the  system  of  compartmentalization,  and  scientists  fought  a  continual 
battle against  security-driven  compartmentalization,  so far as it was pos- 
sible to do so. However, their struggle was also with the inevitable de facto 
compartmentalization that inevitably arises in all complex organizations. lZ5 
The solution was  simply to provide for more face-to-face  and free inter- 
action, to encourage meetings and discussions at as many levels as possible 
and among as many specialized work groups as possible. This is how and 
why  the  weekly  Colloquium  for  all  staff  members  assumed  such  im- 
portance. The Colloquium was  considered important as a means of dis- 
seminating information, and also as a way of creating solidarity and face- 
to-face  accountability.  In  negotiating  the  organizational  forms  in  and 
through which  technical  information  would  flow,  Los Alamos  scientists 
were also trying to specify and fix the moral order of the laboratory, what 
kind of place it was. 
From the start, the idea of the Colloquium ran up against the facts of 
compartmentalization  and the considerations  recommending substantial 
barriers to information flow. The idea of regular Colloquia for the whole 
staff was proposed by Bethe at a Governing Board meeting in early May 
1943. While  the  Board  endorsed  Bethe's  recommendation,  appointing 
Teller to organize the meetings, it was added that the Colloquia should be 
'carefully supervised'. lZ6 In allowing for Colloquia, it was understood that, 
due to its geographical isolation, compartmentalization could be somewhat 
relaxed at Los Alamos. The laboratory was to be one cell within the system, 
and its internal freedom would be made up for by the rigid policing of its 
external boundaries: Manhattan Project information was to come into LOS 
Alamos (as needed and requested) but none was to go out (unless General 571  Thorpe O Shapin: Who Was Oppenheimer? 
Groves deemed it fit to do so). However, the application of compartmen- 
talization  to particular  cases was  always problematic and contestable. So 
Groves  told  Oppenheimer  that  he  and  the  post  commander  Colonel 
Ashbridge  were  'disturbed'  about  Oppenheimer's  review  of  the  whole 
programme  given  at the first  Colloquium meeting. The resulting  com- 
promise was the classification of personnel into staff-members  (possessing 
scientific  first  degrees)  and  non-staff  (lacking  such  qualifications),  the 
Colloquium  being  open  only  to  the former. This distinction  effectively 
excluded  most  of  the  SEDs,  and  also  most  civilian  technicians.  The 
compromise also involved staff members being vetted in a formal 'vouch- 
ing'  procedure. This ostensibly  formal procedure in  fact relied  only on 
Oppenheimer vouching for the senior scientists while others were passed 
by  statements  from  three  laboratory  employee^.'^'  There  were  to  be 
restrictions on the discussion in Colloquia of the work of other sites, such 
as Oak Ridge, Hanford, Chicago and Columbia. But how these restrictions 
were to operate was  always  open to dispute. Teller, for example,  argued 
that restrictions were 'contrary to the spirit' of the Colloquium. He noted 
the 'vague [ness]' of the criterion that information had to be 'justified by its 
connection  with  the  work  here',  especially  when  one  purpose  of  the 
Colloquium was to encourage new ideas at Los Alamos."' 
Compartmentalization was  not  only  produced  by  Groves'  require-
ments for secrecy. Scientists were at the same time grappling with the de 
facto  compartmentalization which,  we  have  noted,  arose from  the sheer 
complexity of  laboratory work. For example,  it is  ironic that the Liaison 
Committee, established in November  1943 to coordinate communication 
with other Manhattan Project sites, was by January 1944 forced to turn its 
attention to the problem of so-called 'internal liais~n'.'~"he  problems of 
communication, faced in 1942 due to the geographical  dispersion of the 
fast neutron laboratories, and to which Los Alamos  itself was  to be the 
solution, were now being reproduced  within Los Alamos due to special- 
ization  and its accompanying organizational  differentiation. This had, in 
fact, been an abiding concern. Already by November 1943, Oppenheimer 
said that 'he felt the laboratory was now so complicated that he should call 
to the attention of the board the problem of relations between  division^'.'^^ 
That concern was never eliminated. Rather, Los Alamos existed in tension 
between,  on the one hand, the expanding, specializing and compartmen- 
talizing tendencies endemic to complex organizations  and, on the other, 
attempts to assert the importance of  the personal,  the informal and the 
collegial. 
Despite restrictions, the Colloquium was  a symbolic gesture towards 
an informal,  a  face-to-face  and an  egalitarian  conception  of  legitimate 
order at scientific Los Alamos. Gathering together, in one hall, personnel 
from all the different Divisions and their Groups served to render visible 
the organization's intellectual and social coherence, to display scientific Los 
Alamos  to  its  inhabitants. The members  of  the  Governing  Board  were 
sensible  that  the  Colloquium  was  something  more  than  a  means  of 
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first Colloquium be used to re-instil 'habits of work' after the chaotic first 
month  spent  setting up  buildings  and equipment.13' Oppenheimer had 
defended the concept to Groves on the grounds of 'effectiveness, morale 
and  security'.13'  Bacher,  Head  of  the  Experimental  Physics  Division, 
observed  that  the 'most  important  value  of  the colloquia'  was  'integra- 
ti~n'.'?~ And, quite generally, epistemic integration and information flow 
were seen as crucial elements in 'morale'. 
The Berkeley philosopher,  David  Hawkins,  recruited  to  coordinate 
liaison between the laboratory and the post, wrote that 'The colloquium 
was  less  a  means  of  providing  information  than  an  institution  which 
contributed to the viability of the Laboratory and to maintaining the sense 
of common effort and responsibility'.13' And General Groves agreed that 
the Colloquium 'existed not so much to provide information as to maintain 
morale and a feeling of common purpose and responsibility'. 13'  Bethe said 
that in the Colloquia 'everybody in the laboratory felt a part of the whole 
and felt that he should contribute to the success of the program'.'36  Years 
after  the  Manhattan  Project  ended, Victor  Weisskopf  praised  the  Co-
ordinating  Council in similar terms: it contributed to the 'morale  of the 
place' because it gave you 'the feeling that you knew what was really going 
on'. Even if this feeling was an illusion, 'the point is you had the feeling and 
that was  of  such importance'. All  of  this  he  attributed to Oppenheimer 
who, as chairman of the committee, 'did that extremely well'.13' 
Weisskopf similarly ascribed the Colloquium and its integrating effects 
personally to Oppenheimer: 'Oppenheimer insisted on having these regular 
colloquia against the opposition of the security-minded people, who wan- 
ted each man only to know his part of the work. He knew that each one 
must know the whole thing if he was to be ~reative'.'~%ethe  wrote in the 
same vein: 'Oppenheimer had to fight hard for free discussion among all 
qualified members of the laboratory. But the free flow of information and 
discussion,  together  with  Oppenheimer's  personality,  kept  morale  at  its 
highest  throughout  the  war'.139  Alvarez  insisted  that  'The  laboratory's 
fantastic morale could be traced directly to the personal quality of Oppen- 
heimer's  guidance'.'40  The physicist Rudolf Peierls also credited the com- 
parative  openness  of  discussion  at  Los  Alamos,  and  the  laboratory's 
consequent high  morale,  to  Oppenheimer personally:  'Inside  the labo- 
ratory he was able to maintain the completely free exchange of information 
between its scientific members'. '" 
But  Oppenheimer  was  not  only  credited  with  creating  integrative 
devices such as the Colloquium. He was importantly credited with being a 
site and source of  integration  in  himself.  One after another, Los Alamos 
scientists  draw  attention to Oppenheimer, in effect, 'knowing  it all'.  He 
was, it is recurrently said, the one person at Los Alamos who had a total 
vision of all that was going on there; the one person who was in a position 
to have  an overview; and the one person  with the intellectual range and 
ability  to  possess  a  global  view  in  fact.  So  Bethe  recalls  that 
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. . . hew and understood  everything  that  went  on  in  the  laboratory, 
whether it was chemistry or theoretical physics or machine shop. He could 
keep it all in his head and co-ordinate it. . . .There was just nobody else in 
that laboratory who came even close to him. In his h~wledge.'~" 
That embodied integration was both mental and physical, conceptual 
and moral.  Oppenheimer  symbolically integrated  the laboratory  by  his 
physical  circulation  through  it,  visiting meetings  in theoretical  physics, 
experimental physics and metallurgy. Many commentators insisted on the 
importance  of  his  physical  presence - as  a  symbol  of  coherence,  as  a 
display of concern and even as a hard-to-articulate causal element in the 
solution of  technical problems. Some commentary, indeed,  ascribes Op- 
penheimer's  skill at integration to the circumstance that he just  knew an 
enormous amount of the relevant physics and, more generally, that he had 
a grasp of a greater range of sciences than anyone else at Los Alamos. He 
could walk into a technical discussion in an area about which he might be 
presumed ignorant and make a decisive intervention, if not because of his 
factual or theoretical knowledge, then because of his ability to cut incisively 
to the heart of any kind of problem. So, it is said, Oppenheimer 
.. . once joined a metallurgy session during an inconclusive argument over 
the  type  of  refractory  container to be  used  for melting plutonium.  Al- 
though  this was hardly  familiar  ground to  a theoretical  physicist, after 
Oppenheimer had listened  for a time,  he summed up the discussion so 
clearly  that  the  right  answer,  though  he  did  not  provide  it,  was  im-
mediately apparent.'" 
But other commentary on Oppenheimer's  intellectual scope, and its 
integrating power, is not so easy to understand in these terms, gesturing at 
the mental r61e  of  his  physical presence. Weisskopf noted  'some  almost 
super ESP kind of connection' by virtue of which Oppenheimer managed 
to be  on the  spot when  and where  exciting  developments were  taking 
place. li4 
[He] was intellectually and even physically present at each significant step; 
he was present in the laboratory or in the seminar room when a new effect 
was  measured,  when  a  new  idea  was  conceived.  It  was  not  that  he 
contributed so many ideas or suggestions; he did so sometimes, but his 
main  influence  came from his continuous  and intense presence,  which 
produced a sense of direct participation in all of us.'" 
Weisskopf emphasized 'how tremendously important it was for the morale 
at Los Alamos . . . if  you come to the final experiment and the director is 
there'.  Oppenheimer 'always went to the important  discussions  at semi- 
nars, in spite of his administrative  load'.lA6  This was a display of human 
concern and of  personal  involvement.  Oppenheimer's  presence was  sig- 
nificant  and it made a difference, both intellectually and morally. Wilson 
said: 'In his presence, I became more intelligent, more vocal, more intense, 
more prescient, more poetic myself'.'"  The head of metallurgical work at 
Los Alamos, Cyril Smith, recalled that an informal five-minute discussion 
with Oppenheimer was all it took to give 'the necessary perspective'.li8 574  Social Studies of Science 3014 
FIGURE 6 
'Like a Good Host with his Guests': Oppenheimer at a Social Gathering in Fuller Lodge 
at Los Alamos 
Source: LANL LAT-422 
Something potently  intellectual was  said  to  happen  in  face-to-face 
interaction with Oppenheimer that was hard to express, and that itself was 
not even wholly verbal. This guidance was not experienced as domination; 
rather, Oppenheimer was regarded as a facilitator, in Bethe's analogy, 'like 
a  good  host  with  his  guests'  (see  Figure  6).'"  According  to  physicist 
Eugene Wigner, who worked at the University of  Chicago's Metallurgical 
Laboratory during the War,  the scientists  at Los Alamos  'disliked  being 
visibly directed.  Oppenheimer understood that. He knew their  strengths 
and weaknesses without asking and treated them with some sen~itivity'.'~~ 
Like an ideal early modern gentleman, he was considered to have mastered 
the art of seeming artless - effortless superiority, sprezzatura. He signalled 
his authority and communicated his expectations, as Wigner described it, 
'very  easily and naturally,  with  just  his  eyes, his two hands, and a half- 
lighted pipe'.'"  Oppenheimer was seen personally, and even physically, to 
catalyze the emergence of  a unity and coherence that already  existed in 
potential. Hawkins recalled that, if  there was 'an  incipient disagreement' 
during  a  Governing  Board  meeting,  'one  would  listen  patiently  to  an 
argument beginning and finally Oppenheimer would  summarize, and he 
would do it in such a way that there was no disagreement'. 'It was', he says, 
'a kind of magical trick that brought respect from all those people, some of 
them his  superiors  in terms  of  their  scientific record,  brought  them to 
acknowledge him as the boss.. . . So that's  why  . . . there was never  any 
disagreement that he was the leader of that enterprise'.'''  If, as Bethe said, 
'wherever he was there was life and excitement', there was also science and 
the solution to dispersed and complex scientific problems. 
Commentators sometimes talk  in the same frame  about  Oppenhei- 
mer's omniscience, his omnipresence and his virtue. He was supposed not 
only to know all the science of Los Alamos, but also all the scientists - and 
not just  the scientists.  Noblesse  oblige joined  to the common touch: 'The 
indefatigable  Oppie',  a historian writes,  'knew not only all the scientists, 
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wrote home to his parents after the bombing of Hiroshima, and described 
the 'informality'  of  Los Alamos which,  he said, was  'unparalleled  in any 
other organization that I have seen'. 'For example',  he told them, 'several 
times Dr Oppenheimer has called me for something or other . . . and every 
time, when I would answer the phone with "Doty",  the voice at the other 
end would  say,  "This is  Oppy" '.I5'  Oppenheimer set the tone,  and the 
laboratory followed his example. This moral example was communicated, 
crucially, through his physical presence. He showed himself, and by doing 
so,  showed his  concern and his  integrative  knowledge.  It was  a kind  of 
squire's  passage,  as well  as a display of  mastery and of  belonging to the 
place. A Group leader wrote: 
Each Sunday he would ride his beautiful chestnut horse from the cavalry 
stable at the east side of the town to the mountain trails on the west side of 
town greeting each of the people he passed with a wave of his pork-pie hat 
and a friendly remark. He knew everyone who lived in Los Alamos, from 
the top scientists to the children of the Spanish-American janitors - they 
were all Oppenheimer's  family.''' 
This is possibly the kind of thing the English physicist James Tuck had in 
mind  when  he  called  Oppenheimer  'a  great  gentleman'.'56 When  the 
Oppenheimers'  daughter was  born,  the  'whole  town'  came  to  give  its 
blessing: 'The sign "Oppenheimer"  was placed over baby Toni's crib and 
people filed by  in the corridor for  days to view  the boss's  baby girl'.'j7 
Oppenheimer was  also celebrated for his concern over the lives of  scien- 
tists' spouses and families. Like a secular saint, he was praised for tending 
the sick and consoling the bereaved: 'A  little aloof, but still a warm and 
comforting presence'. 158 
Knowing everything  about Los Alamos  meant knowing human and 
moral things as well  as natural and technical things. The man who was 
supposed  to  be  personally  responsible  for  the  integrative  and  morale- 
enhancing  Colloquia  was  the  same  man  who  was  supposed  to  know 
essentially everything about the lives of Los Alamos people, to know them 
as emotional and social beings as well as the bearers of  scientific thought. 
In trying to say just  this,  Edward Teller concluded  that the man whose 
power he was eventually to destroy was indeed a charismatic leader: 
Throughout the war years,  Oppie knew in detail what was going on in 
every part of the Laboratory. He was incredibly  quick and perceptive  in 
analyzing human  as well  as technical problems.  Of  the more than  ten 
thousand  people  who  eventually  came to  work  at Los Alamos,  Oppie 
knew several hundred intimately, by which I mean that he knew what their 
relationships with one another were and what made them tick. He knew 
how to organize, cajole, humor, soothe feelings - how to lead powerfully 
without seeming to do. He was  an exemplar of  dedication,  a hero who 
never lost his humanness. Disappointing him somehow carried with it a 
sense  of  wrongdoing.  Los  ~l&~os' amazing  success  grew  out  of  the 
brilliance,  enthusiasm and charisma with which Oppenheimer led it.'" Social Studies of Science 3014 
The Conditions of Modern Charisma 
Not everyone who was at wartime Los Alamos attributed the success of the 
project, the solidarity of the place or the morale of participants to Oppen- 
heimer's charisma. Not all even agreed that he was a charismatic character, 
or even  a very admirable  one. That should be in no way  surprising: all 
organizations contain diverse points of  view on many organizational mat- 
ters,  and  an  organization  as  complex  as  wartime  Los  Alamos  is  no 
exception. We  have already indicated that reference to the effective r81e  of 
Oppenheimer's  personality was  most  dense  among the  scientific inhab- 
itants of Los Alamos and, from the evidence we have presented, especially 
among the physicists for whom  Oppenheimer was,  of  course,  a natural 
spokesman. That too  should  be  no surprise,  and we  have  described  in 
detail the problems of organizational life that were of particular concern to 
the  elite  scientists,  and whose  effective  resolution  mobilized  Oppenhei- 
mer's charisma. 
Given the variability of  individual  temperaments and points  of view, 
however, there would be no reason to expect that even all physicists at Los 
Alamos fell in with what seems clearly to have been the dominant view of 
the matter  in their  group.  Seth Neddermeyer - the so-called  'father  of 
implosion' -had notably difficult relations with Oppenheimer, and said so: 
'I didn't look up to him. From my point of  view,  he was  an intellectual 
snob'.16'  Teller,  whose  comments  about  Oppenheimer's  charisma  and 
organizational brilliance  have  already been  quoted, has continued inter- 
mittently to project quite negative views of Oppenheimer's  capacities and 
conduct,  and his  notorious  denunciation  of  Oppenheimer at  the  1954 
security hearings speaks for itself.  Rabi,  whom we  have  also quoted  on 
Oppenheimer's  charisma  and its  consequential  r8le  in  Los Alamos  life, 
was,  in other moods,  capable of  articulating less rosy views. Writing to 
Weisskopf about the latter's article on Los Alamos, Rabi said: 
I liked your piece about Oppenheimer in Los Alamos very much. How- 
ever, I  feel  that the mood  of  exaltation  which  you  and I had was  not 
shared by  everybody.. . . One forgets  at  this  long distance  of  almost a 
quarter of a century the extreme tension which existed on the hill.Ib' 
Emilio Segre was always unimpressed by the Oppenheimer phenomenon, 
regarding the prewar Berkeley cult of personality as so much embarrassing 
colonial na'ivete: 
[A]t the  time,  he  was  considered  a demigod by  himself  and others  at 
Berkeley,  and  as  such  he  spake  in  learned  and  obscure  fashions.. . . 
Oppenheimer's loyal disciples hung on his words and put on correspond- 
ent airs. . . . I had the impression that their celebrated general culture was 
not superior to that expected in a boy who had attended a good European 
high school. I was already acquainted with most of their cultural discov- 
eries, and I found Oppenheimer's ostentation slightly ridiculous. 
Segre thought that Enrico Fermi was the real thing;  Oppenheimer a pale 
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Perhaps I did not sufficiently conceal my  lack of supine admiration for 
Oppenheimer, and I found him  unfriendly, even  if covertly, for a good 
part of  my  career, except when  he  wanted  me  to  join  his  team  at Los 
Alamos. 
Nor was Segre taken with either the authenticity or the content of Oppen- 
heimer's  politics,  and he  professed  himself  fed  up with  Oppenheimer's 
repeating 'with the faith of the true believer, the nonsense originating from 
Stalin's  Cominform'.  Interestingly,  Segre was  one Los Alamos  physicist 
who gave General Groves full credit for managerial nous, for his adaptabil- 
ity  in  dealing  with  a temperamentally  difficult group of  scientists,  and, 
indeed,  for coping sensitively with the crisis over compartmentalization: 
'General Groves wiggled out of this impasse with good sense'."j2 
Groves learned to get along with Oppenheimer, getting the best out of 
him  and using him  deftly  as  a channel  between  military  concerns and 
scientific sensitivities. He respected Oppenheimer but, understandably, he 
never  recorded  any sense that Oppenheimer was  the 'boss',  or that the 
success  of  the  Manhattan  Project  was  due  to  Oppenheimer's  force  of 
personality.16'The final judgement  of history on the matter has yet to be 
rendered but, as things presently  stand, that judgement  has undoubtedly 
been affected by the volubility of Los Alamos's  scientific inhabitants; the 
public eminence to which they - and especially the physicists - rose after 
Hiroshima;  the general  individualism  of  our culture (if  not its academic 
sociological sector) and its receptiveness to heroically-individualistic  sto- 
ries; and the sensibilities held in common between academic scientists and 
the academic historians who have tended to write about Los Alamos. 
Yet not even all historians are willing to ascribe the effective working of 
Los Alamos to Oppenheimer's personal leadership, or to see the academic 
forms for which Oppenheimer spoke as crucial to the project's success. The 
historian of technology, Thomas P. Hughes, notably disputes the view that 
Los  Alamos  was  primarily  a  scientific  success  story  and,  at  least  by 
implication,  down-plays the pertinence of the academic point of view. For 
Hughes, it is vital to remember that the Manhattan Project was run by the 
Army Corps of Engineers, an organization that had much prior experience 
in  managing  large-scale  technological-engineering  enterprises.  Other 
models were provided  by  such massive  government projects as the Ten- 
nessee Valley  Authority.  Moreover,  Hughes  argues,  the  conjunction  of 
scientists, engineers and managers had many precedents in such innovative 
American production companies as General Electric, Du Pont, Tennessee 
Eastman,  Ford,  Allis-Chalmers,  American Telephone  & Telegraph,  and 
several others. And if Los Alamos was, so to speak, mission-control for the 
Manhattan  Project,  its  success  also  depended  upon  the  resolution  of 
production  problems  at  Oak  Ridge  and  Hanford.  It  is  true,  Hughes 
acknowledges, that many Los Alamos scientists were highly uncomfortable 
with military forms of  organization,  and that their sensibilities had to be 
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thing as saying that Los Alamos was a scientific show, or that its Scientific 
Director was Los Alamos 'personified'.'63 
It  is  vitally  important  to  recognize  these  other  voices,  and  other 
interpretations, testifying about organizational life at Los Alamos. They do 
not diminish the story we  have told, because we  neither want to nor can 
represent  any such story as exhaustive or definitive. This is how matters 
appeared to many influential Los Alamos inhabitants, and these are some 
of  the resources they used to make sense of their situation, and to shape 
that situation into the forms and norms that they regarded as necessary to 
the  project's  success. This was  their  point  of  view;  this  was  how  they 
experienced and made sense of Los Alamos; and, accordingly, if  we want 
to speak of the realities of Los Alamos life, this is an ineliminable aspect of 
those realities. 
For all the specificity of our account, there is still something we  want 
to retrieve from the Los Alamos story that has possibly general implications 
for  understanding  late  modern  technoscientific  organizations.  We  have 
described  wartime  Los Alamos  as  a place  marked  by  a high  degree  of 
normative uncertainty. That is to say, many inhabitants were unsure what 
sort of place it was, and therefore what norms pertained to behaviour in it. 
Other inhabitants were evidently sure, but their certainty about the form 
and norms of  the place  was  confronted  by  the dissenting certainties  of 
associates and neighbours on whose effective work they were dependent. 
And we  have  argued that it was  in connection with this high  degree of 
normative uncertainty that many scientific inhabitants recognized Oppen- 
heimer's  charisma and, indeed, helped Oppenheimer to become a charis- 
matic leader of  a specific kind. 
We  also pointed  out that for Max Weber, and many modernity theo- 
rists following him, modernity is  signed not just  by 'disenchantment' but 
by the disappearance - or, at least, the attenuation - of charismatic forms 
of  authority. What need of  embodied personal  authority - indeed,  what 
room for such authority - is there in the world of rational bureaucracy and 
of rational science? But here,  characteristically, such social theorists tend 
to mistake  the part  for  the  whole,  absolute  for  relative  change,  ideal- 
typifications  of  bureaucratic  and  complex  organizations  for  rich  and 
detailed descriptions of what quotidian organizational life is actually like. 
Normative uncertainty is endemic, and it is important to remember that. It 
is arguable that the normative life of any organization -however routinized, 
however complex,  however bureaucratic  and however instrumental in its 
goals - cannot be adequately described by its organizational  charts or by 
its inscribed rules and  regulation^.'^' Normative uncertainty does not exist 
only in the absence of rules. Formal structures, plans and rules are them- 
selves generative of ~ncertainty.'~~  In such a situation, the right thing to do 
has recurrently  to be  articulated  and vouched for by  someone.'67 Conse- 
quently,  modern formal and instrumental modes of  organization  do not 
eliminate the conditions for charisma. On the contrary, formal organiza- 
tion  may  create  a  space  and  provide  resources  for  the  flourishing  of 
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Much circumstantial and anecdotal evidence suggests that the experi- 
ence of intense normative uncertainty is becoming more and more charac- 
teristic of late modern technoscientific organizations and, accordingly, that 
charismatic forms of authority are becoming more and more important in 
the functioning of these organizations. Far from disappearing, charismatic 
authority thrives right at the heart of  the technoscientific  institutions that 
are busily making late modernity what it is. Journalists, business historians 
and participants  themselves recurrently describe the dependence of  such 
organizations on the embodied personal authority of key individuals. Quite 
often, as it happens, 'charisma'  is the term of  art they choose to use. So 
Wernher von Braun of the Marshall Space Flight Center during the Apollo 
period  was  said  to  be  charismatic;  so  too  was  Akio  Morita  of  Sony 
Electronics;  so was  Seymour  Cray  (the  supercomputer  engineer);  so  is 
Steve Jobs of Apple Computers, Larry Ellison of  the Oracle Corporation, 
Daniel Cohen of the Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH), 
and  Kari  Stefansson  of  the  controversial  Icelandic  genomics  company 
decode. Increasingly, in the late modern world, innovating organizations 
are marked by innovative institutional forms. Is this work or play? Profit- 
orientated or disinterested? Business or academic? How is working to be 
recognized  and assessed? Where may it take place? Who may tell whom 
what to do, and with what consequences? Some of these questions, as we 
have seen, formed part of  the texture of normative life and instrumental 
activity  at wartime  Los  Alamos  and,  variously  stressed  and combined, 
some have heightened pertinence in the world of  contemporary high-tech 
and biotech.  Indeed,  a  few  social  scientists  are  now  beginning  to  tell 
persuasive stories about charismatic authority in late modern technoscien- 
tific  organizations,  and  about  the uncertain  norms and forms  that  call 
charisma into being and that make it consequential. John Law has inter- 
estingly described  how  his  ethnographic  work  at  the  Daresbury  SERC 
laboratory in England occasioned a change of his professional, sociological 
mind about charisma. Paul Rabinow's studies of the Cetus Corporation (in 
which the polymerase  chain reaction was discovered),  of the CEPH, and 
now of decode, all refer in a matter-of-fact way to the embodied personal 
authority - the 'charisma' - of key actors, and all show how that authority 
counted as a partial solution to problems of normative uncertainty.16" 
The charisma to which present-day social scientists,  and we,  refer is 
not understood  as  a supernatural gift,  nor is it  likely to be  for the late 
modern technoscientists who  use  such vocabulary.  Nor,  again,  did  Los 
Alamos  participants  who happened  to use  other vocabulary  to describe 
Oppenheimer's  embodied  personal  authority  ascribe  such  attributes to 
divine grace. That is just  to say that they, we  and, of course, Max Weber, 
are moderns  of a secular  frame of  mind and, in the culture we  tend to 
share, such religious sentiments are not very common.  We have described a 
secularized charisma, a charisma construed as an interactional accomplish- 
ment, not as a gift of  grace. But, while the ultimate sources of  charisma 
may differ between the followers of Jesus and those of  Oppenheimer, the 
modern  form is  no less  consequential,  nor  qualitatively  different  in its 580  Social Studies of Science 3014 
organizational functions, nor even very easy to exhaust by talking about it 
in  approved  naturalistic  modern modes.  For  all  our ability to  produce 
locally persuasive  accounts of  charisma as interactional accomplishment, 
charisma  remains,  far richer  than  any  form  of  academic  talk  about it. 
Charismatic forms of authority, we  suggest, are not marginal survivals of 
pre-modernity;  they are right at the heart of  those forces shaping the late 
modern world. 
Appendix: Note on Sources 
For reasons that should be obvious, it has been impossible to find any 'real-time' 
documentary commentary by wartime Los Alamos participants on Oppenheimer's personal 
characteristics and their organizational  consequences. No one can be absolutely sure about 
what does not exist, but we are not alone in suspecting that there are no such documents. 
Alice Kimball Smith (a historian of wartime Los Alamos who was there herself) notes that 
'personal journals were forbidden, and so far none has come to light'  [Smith, op. cit. note 
17, 371. Written and oral communication containing any substantial reflections or details 
about Los Alamos life was very strictly prohibited for security reasons. 
A letter home from Los Alamos by a young member of the Army Special Engineer 
Detachment immediately after Hiroshima testifies both to the swiftness with which that 
prohibition was lifted and to the ambiguity of its terms. Writing to his mother and father on 
7 August 1945, Ed Doty said that 'We have been told, in a letter from Dr Oppenheimer, 
that we can mention in letters anything that has come out in the papers or over the radio. 
[But] the security policy on a lot of things is still unsettled, so I can't  tell you much more 
than that right now'.  Elsewhere, we quote that letter's  sentiments about Oppenheimer's 
admirably informal personal manner, and this letter is, arguably, among the earliest such 
documentary testimony that survives in any form [Ed Doty to his parents, 7 August 1945; 
Los Alamos Historical Museum]. 
There is no reason for us to side-step the fact that the bulk of the anecdotal evidence 
pertinent to talking about Oppenheimer's special virtues and capacities - and, for all we can 
now tell, every single use of the word 'charisma'  in reference to him - derives from the 
period after the successful conclusion of the Manhattan Project. Success, it might plausibly 
be said, retrospectively precipitates charismatic leaders with 20120 hindsight. We  can, 
however, think of charismatic failures, and technical success in constructing a working 
bomb does not equate to a universally sanguine view of the range of effects brought about 
by the Manhattan Project. A portion of the commentary we use interestingly emerges from 
the time surrounding the Oppenheimer security hearings and the withdrawal of his 
clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954, when he took on the r6le of the 
tragic hero of the American scientific establishment. The official judgement that 
Oppenheimer had defects of character generated an immediate and vigorous defence of that 
character by his friends and sympathizers. 
The particular setting of post  hoc accounting, therefore, may well have something to do 
with participants'  stories about wartime Los Alamos but, on due consideration and with 
qualifications to be made, we  are content to accept these stories as substantial reflections of 
genuine wartime sentiments. What we are faced with here is  just  a special (albeit a very 
interesting) version of an endemic historians' predicament. As  a matter of practice - and 
perhaps even of principle -historians  must always infer what happened and what was 
believed from testimony removed - in some degree and to some extent - from the scene of 
the happening or the believing. Samuel Pepys' diary, for example, is superbly direct 
testimony of the Great F~re  of London, just  on the condition you understand that he wrote 
it up some days after the Fire was over, that he relied massively on others' evidence of what 
happened,  and that he believed the Fire was an act of arson by the Catholics. 
Like other historians, we keep the possibility of post  hoc rationalization  or 
romanticizntion firmly in mind, and gauge the security of our inferences by using a set of 
robust and routine maxims for the evaluation of testimony: the directness of anecdotal 581  Thorpe & Shapin:Who  Was Oppenheimer? 
sources; their multiplicity, diversity and coherence; sources' possible reasons for 
misrepresenting matters; the plausibility of anecdotes, given the wide range of other 
information we have about what went on at Los Alamos. We  can't do better than that, but 
then, historians never can. 
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